02 Hazards¶

A hazard is a system state that, combined with worst-case environment conditions, leads to a loss. Each maps to one or more losses (01-losses.md).

ID	Hazard	Leads to
H-1	A state-changing tool is invoked without validating operator intent (no HITL gate at T2 or above).	L-1, L-2
H-2	An action executes before, or without, an immutable audit record being written.	L-3
H-3	Tier classification under-rates an action (an irreversible action treated as reversible).	L-1, L-2
H-4	Attacker-influenced content (collected host data, command output, a feed) is allowed to authorize or shape actuation in the same session as sensitive data and an actuation capability (the lethal trifecta).	L-1, L-2, L-4
H-5	Actuation targets the wrong host type (for example an SSH path attempted against an immutable Talos node).	L-2
H-6	A reconciliation applies a change derived from a stale or wrong desired-state, or against a misidentified target.	L-2, L-5
H-7	The MCP surface is reachable without authentication, on a routable bind, or can be used to pivot into the private network (SSRF).	L-6, L-4
H-8	A credential is over-scoped, non-revocable, or logged, or the kill switch does not stop execution.	L-1, L-4
H-9	Output bodies, secrets, or unbounded attacker content are written into the audit log.	L-4, L-3
H-10	A fact is mutated or deleted in place, so history (and therefore the as-of truth) is lost.	L-3, L-5

Hazard-to-loss matrix¶